TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA

RSA key exchange does not provide perfect forward secrecy because if an attacker captures the RSA private key, they can decrypt all past communications encrypted with the corresponding public key. This is due to the static nature of the key pairs used in RSA, which contrasts with protocols like Diffie-Hellman, where ephemeral keys ensure that past sessions remain secure even if current keys are compromised.

RSA as an authentication mechanism in cipher suites is secure because it relies on the difficulty of factoring large prime numbers. This makes it computationally infeasible for attackers to derive the private key from the public key, ensuring confidentiality and integrity in secure communications.

DES should not be used in cipher suites due to its weak 56-bit key size, making it highly vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Modern standards require stronger encryption, and DES's vulnerabilities compromise security, making it unsuitable for protecting sensitive data in contemporary applications.

Chosen prefix attacks for SHA1 are feasible at an accessible cost to a well-funded adversary. This level of expense, while significant, does not pose a substantial barrier to attackers with sufficient resources, making such attacks a credible threat.

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is vulnerable to the Lucky13 and POODLE (in TLS v1.2 and below) attacks. The Lucky13 attack exploits timing discrepancies in padding validation, allowing attackers to gradually reveal plaintext. The POODLE attack leverages padding errors to decrypt ciphertext by repeatedly modifying and sending it to the server, observing the error responses. These vulnerabilities arise from CBC's handling of padding and error messages, making it less secure than modern encryption modes like Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), which offer stronger integrity and confidentiality guarantees.